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Recent literature on innovation strategy and organizational change has challenged the 
classical punctuated equilibrium pattern (Abernathy and Utterback 1978) that 
alternates long periods of stability with short bursts of radical change in the dominant 
design of products. Research into high-tech sectors such as the computer industry 
(Brown 1997) and into the mass-production sector (Chapel 1996) has addressed the 
issue of repeated radical innovation trajectories and proposed theoretical patterns for 
«neo-industrial organizations» (Ekstedt and al. 1999), «intensive innovation-based 
strategies,» and «design-oriented organizations» (Hatchuel 1999, Midler 2002). 
 
This chapter analyzes such ever-changing contexts. We try to demonstrate that such 
innovation trajectories cannot be analyzed as merely a succession of product projects, 
but rather must be tightly connected to deep transformations in the «permanent» 
organization where they are found. Our conceptual framework in analyzing such 
dynamics is based on the basic concept of design system, defined as consisting of three 
components (Mahmoud-Jouini and Midler 1999): the company’s strategy, the 
knowledge/learning management system, and the project management process for new 
product development. Such a conceptual framework is very similar to the 
action/knowledge formation process theoretical framework for analyzing neo-
industrial managing (Ekstedt and al. 1999). We will attempt to demonstrate how 
keeping track of intensive innovation trajectories over the long term requires the 
periodic reshaping of the design systems of a firm, and, consequently, leads to deep a 
renewal of such internal organization processes as reframing boundaries and relations 
with markets and other companies. 
 
Our case study will examine a major European automotive supplier of car radio 
equipment that offers a paradigmatic case of major, repeated breakthroughs over the 
last four decades. The company we studied has, by dint of repeated and significant 
changes, managed to remain a worldwide leader in its field throughout the period in 
question. Its name and shareholders have changed on several occasions. The company 
has carried out numerous far-reaching internal reorganizations, and its relationships 
with automobile manufacturers have been similarly transformed.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, we analyze the successive changes of the product, from 
the first car radio developed by the firm in the late 1950s, to ongoing new generations 
of «in-car, multimedia equipment.» These products involve technologies as varied as 
advanced radio systems, information technology, and GPS (global positioning 
systems), that provide services such as communication, navigation, security, and 
entertainment.  
 
The second part of the chapter analyzes the various steps in the firm’s evolution from 
initially being a spin-off a major European electronic company to redefining the 
customer interface to meet the after sales−OEM transition, internal organizational 
restructuring of product development and technology management, and financially 
merging with another major first-tier automotive supplier and service provider. 
 
This chapter is based on a series of interactive research studies which began in 1994 
(Kesseler 1998), (Midler 2000) (Lenfle and Midler 2002). These studies are part of a 
research program within the Centre de Recherche en Gestion de l’Ecole polytechnique 
on innovation strategy and project management which analyzes design system 
transitions in various industrial contexts (Benghozi and al. 2000). 
 
 
Part One: The Product Trajectory: History and Characterization 
 
There has been a series of major transformations in the world of car audio since the 
1950s, in terms of technology, architecture, and functionality. Vacuum tubes have 
been replaced by transistors and integrated components, and software development 
have moved to the forefront. Architecture has evolved in terms of definition of internal 
electronics system components, the system/control interface, system integration into 
the automobile, distribution of components between those built into the system and 
those available via remote control. Functions increasingly removed from the original 
purpose have been incorporated, such as, CD and cassette players, telephones, 
navigational systems, emergency aid. Markets too have evolved, as distributor-based 
marketing to the consumer market has been replaced by the supply of premier 
equipment to manufacturers. Today, the simple act of naming a product, or even 
calling it a product rather than a service or system, is problematic. 
 
1. From car radio to Information-Communication-Entertainment (ICE) systems. 
 
The history of car radio began in 1929 with Motorola. Philips developed its first car 
radio in 1934. The technology, based on that of traditional radios, used vacuum tubes 
with all the associated problems of power supply and volume. As a result, the first car 
radios were of poor quality, hobbled by problems of interference, unreliability, 
bulkiness, and high energy consumption (see Appendix 2, Figure 1). 
 
Until the 1970s, product innovations were mainly tied to developments in electronic 
components, notably the replacement of vacuum tubes with transistors in the 1960s 
(Philips introduced the first car radio to use only transistors in 1961). With this 
technological development, service quality improved while costs declined, and product 
architecture could be transformed so that all product functions could be incorporated 
into the standard-format «box» (see Appendix 2, Figures 2 and 3). 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the innovation dynamic accelerated and diversified (see Table 
1 in Appendix 1). New functional improvements in radio operation were introduced, 
including digital displays, preset stations, RDS, and TMC. New functions were 
increasingly added to the basic radio function, functions such as cassette and CD 
players, GSM telephone/radio receivers, GPS-based navigation technology, on-board 
computers, and today, dynamic navigation, and Internet access. Car radios have been 
transformed into information-communication-entertainment (ICE) systems. Product 
architectures have also changed greatly. As chip-based components were integrated 
into the box, platform architectures could be steadily redefined and increasingly 
complex functions added without a need for more space or additional cost. Software 
then became more important, and the number of hardware components decreased (see 
graphics in Appendix 2). Finally, the electronics «box» became detachable from the 
faceplate , to provide enhanced security (removable front panels). The architecture 
transformation also involved the integration of ICE systems into the car. Increasingly, 
the box is no longer subject to the constraints imposed by standard formats and 
connections: e.g., steering controls and some information displays can be moved, front 
panel design can be integrated into that of the dashboard, CD changers can be located 
elsewhere in the car. 
 
2. Description of the product trajectory 
 
We will use four characteristics to describe the innovation dynamic for the product: 
technology, use functions, product architecture, and distribution methods. 
 
A process based on rapid and far-reaching changes in technology 
 
Clearly, technological advances, in this and other areas of the electronics industry, 
have driven the dynamic governing car audio products, including those of the 
electronics components (vacuum tubes, transistors, components, chips), 
communications protocols, and computer technologies that play an increasing role in 
car audio systems. 
 
 
Transition from Hardware to Software 
(Source: Kesseler 1998) 
 
We will highlight three consequences of this well-known phenomenon of ongoing 
change in electronics and computer technology. First, the dynamic governing 
innovative product offerings in car audio systems is largely based on continuous cost 
reductions, the concomitant increase in system power, and the more compact size of 
new technology. This primarily applies to economic dynamics driven by product 
offerings. Next, the trend towards smaller size supports a system architecture dynamic 
that constitutes a major challenge for the various industry players. We will address this 
issue below. Finally, the permanent nature of these redefinitions ensures that, although 
electronics plays a crucial, strategic role for car manufacturers, they have never been 
able to master research into the field on their own (witness initial attempts that ended 
in failure). In the 1970s France’s Renault, in particular, attempted to develop a 
subsidiary but had to abandon the idea because it was unable to maintain the 
appropriate electronics expertise in an environment of constant change. 
 
Consequently, trends in car audio systems are primarily driven by companies 
providing electronics technology. This explains the current problems described in the 
next section, where we see that enhanced understanding of how products are used is 
increasingly essential to project success. 
 
Constant changes in system architecture 
 
Product architecture is another field marked by major changes, changes that fall into 
three categories: the architectural dynamic of the internal «box,» the architectural 
dynamic of integrating the system into the car, and the architectural dynamic of the 
relationship between integrated components and components outside the car. These 
three dynamics are closely intertwined. 
 
Internal system architecture has been subject to two concomitant trends. The 
emergence in 1993 of the concept of the platform as a stand-alone technical entity 
provided a way to reduce technical diversity while maintaining the capacity to produce 
a wide range of finished products. 
 
A trend towards modularization (Baldwin and Clark 1997) is gradually establishing an 
engineering architecture based on functional definitions, as shown in the figure below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Technical architecture of an ICE system in 2001. 
Source: Kesseler 1998 
 
Architecture of the combined car audio/automotive system has been subject to three 
different trends. First was a trend towards the concentration/integration of technical 
components within the box, using a standard format and interface, a phase which 
finished in the 1960s. Then came a reverse trend towards relocating certain box 
functions elsewhere in the car, a process that began in the late 1980s, as, for example, 
radio controls were moved to the steering wheel, dashboard displays were converted to 
digital displays, technical functions were integrated into other locations in the car (e.g., 
tuners in the antenna, CD changers under the seat or in the trunk). At the same time, a 
trend towards stylistic integration of the system into the car’s interior design was also 
evident. 
 
Architecture between built-in functions and functions accessed remotely is a recent but 
important area of change. The available services are determined by the complementary 
nature of built-in functions (normally the radio receiver) and functions provided by 
outside service operators (typically, radio transmitters). This distribution of roles is 
undergoing major changes. Built-in functions that have so far been mostly passive 
(such as a radio receiver) are now becoming more active, so that users can define 
services (such as telephones or geographical locating services) based on information 
generated by the vehicle itself. As telecommunications data travels at higher speeds, a 
number of elements that in the past had to be stored in the vehicle itself, either 
physically or as software, could be moved outside the vehicle, such as CD ROM–
based navigational media.  
 
All of these major architectural changes have had profound effects in terms of value 
distribution and the relationships between the firms that design and operate these 
systems. 
 
The functional dynamic 
 
The following five points summarize the nature of this functional dynamic. 
 
At the outset, an approach in which new usage indicators are adopted from fields 
other than the automotive field. The use of functional components is defined and 
understood outside the automotive setting before these components are adopted for use 
there. This was the case with the car radio itself as well as with cassette players, CD 
players, car telephones, and minidisk players. In this way, manufacturers can rely on 
the customer’s previously acquired understanding of how the product operates. These 
components must be significantly adapted when they are imported into an automotive 
environment, so as to cope with vibration and interference, adapt to the ergonomic and 
safety requirements for their use with a conductor, select automatically the best 
transmitter frequencies  (RDS), etc. 
 
 A major expansion in areas for exploration. Whereas initially only radio was 
involved, companies today define their field as one of information-communication-
entertainment (ICE) systems. By bringing together tuner technologies (radio 
communications), GPS (locating systems), GSM (telephone services), television, 
processors, CDs and CD ROMs on a single platform, manufacturers have greatly 
enlarged the scope of potential uses for these systems, for purposes including 
navigation, tourism, travelling assistance, communications, and games.  
 
Today, one of the major difficulties for companies in this field is to explore this 
burgeoning array of new functions, in areas that diverge from the traditional fields in 
which electronics engineers and manufacturers operate. 
 
Accelerated creation of new usage indicators specific to the world of cars. In addition 
to this process of adopting functions from other domains, functions are increasingly 
being created specifically for use in automobiles. Navigational systems are the best-
known current example of this, but other services to assist drivers include tourist 
guides, communication with manufacturer after-sales service departments, and fleet 
management. 
 
The point we wish to emphasize is that, in the past, the adaptation of functions from 
other fields benefited from the fact that customers could apply skills learned outside 
the automotive setting. This considerably reduced the risks in assessing the value of 
these functions in the eyes of potential customers, and greatly accelerated the adoption 
of these functions for use in cars—i.e., no learning curve. However, this is decidedly 
not the case when it comes to entirely new functions. The significant learning curve 
required of customers today is a major obstacle to deploying new innovations in cars, 
since it calls into question traditional methods for marketing new products, which 
innately consist of building company notoriety and educating potential customers.  
 
New competition between services integrated into the car and «portable» services. 
Along with this expansion in the number of fields to be explored, another notable 
factor is the emerging competition from portable products such as portable CD 
players, telephones, and notebook computers that provide users with capacities that 
formerly only built-in electronics could offer.  
 
A redefinition of distribution methods with regard to innovation 
 
At first specialized distribution channels were used for car radios. This situation 
changed in the 1970s: on one hand, the energy crisis of that decade led to the 
disappearance of most specialized dealers, while on the other, vehicle distribution 
networks demanded that car audio systems be distributed as an after-sales accessory 
(the Parts and Accessories business). Finally, in the 1980s, distribution via OEMs 
(Original Equipment Manufacturers) expanded, as car audio manufacturers shifted 
their sights from the consumer market to supplying products to car manufacturers. The 
table below indicates the spectacular growth in this market. 
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Table 1: Evolution of turnover of OEM and after-sales activity. 
Source: Kesseler 1998 
 
The growing significance of OEMs relative to after-sales service involved not only 
market share but also the role played in the innovation dynamic. Until the early 1990s, 
innovations were first tested in the after-sales department before being transferred to 
the OEMs. Today, this time lag is decreasing, and innovations are emerging among 
OEMs at an increasingly early stage (see figure below).  
 
Table 2: Innovation trajectories in car audio systems. 
Source: Kesseler 1998 
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Part Two: The Innovative Firm Odyssey: 
Design cooperation patterns and innovation management dynamics 
 
The car audio «product» has been profoundly transformed several times over the past 
40 years. During this time, the organization we studied has been one of Europe’s 
leaders in the ongoing revitalization of car audio technologies, functions, and markets.  
 
How has this firm been able to withstand the repeated crises arising from the 
successive redefinitions of the product? We will argue in Part Two that the firm’s 
durability can be traced to its ability to redefine its design system to ensure that this 
system remains highly effective for the range of designs that arise from product 
evolution. We will break down this dynamic into four stages, and describe the salient 
aspects of the related design system model for each. 
 
Stage One : Separate design, the importance of integrators and of standards. 
 
The most notable aspect of the prevailing model during the early stages of car radio 
was that radio designers were distinct from car designers. The car radio seemed to be a 
variant of traditional radio products and was designed in the research centers of firms 
such as Motorola or Philips. The integration of the radio into the car rested on two 
avenues for convergence, one gradually replacing the other:  
 
On one hand, there was the integrating player who would complete the design of the 
combined car/car audio system, which was incomplete up to that point: i.e., the 
network of specialty distributors mounting radios in cars. Until the 1970s, integration 
of the radio into the car was in the hands of specialists. This was partly a matter of 
physically installing the radio, antenna, and speakers into the car, but it also involved 
resolving the numerous problems created by interference generated by the vehicle’s 
electrical equipment. Components had to be added to this equipment in order to 
eliminate static. In the 1970s, this integrating player would change: on one hand, the 
energy crisis of that decade led to the disappearance of most specialty craftsmen, while 
on the other, vehicle distribution networks demanded that car audio systems be 
distributed as an accessory (the Parts and Accessories business). At first, this transition 
was not a smooth one, as the network of car distributors did not have the electronics 
expertise to handle problems arising from the incorporation of radios into cars. But it 
had a major consequence, in that in the eyes of their customers, manufacturers, by 
virtue of their networks, became responsible for car radio performance. After-sales 
service gave rise to a design phase focusing on improving the compatibility of the car 
and its radio. 
 
On the other hand was the emergence a gradual standardization process for the car’s 
and the radio’s functional and engineering specifications, whereby each could 
anticipate the dynamic of the other without explicit coordination. This standardization 
involved both the radio’s design constraints to be observed and the evolution of 
manufacturers’ car specifications, including integration of the DYN format into the 
dashboard design, interference suppression in electrical equipment, provision of 
necessary connections for powering the radio, and speaker and antenna prewiring. 
 
2. Stage two: the development of OEM products and platform-based design 
 
OEM1 distribution would clearly pose a significant challenge in terms of design. 
Whereas, under the previous model, the radio was integrated into the car after 
production and sale, now this step could be taken beforehand. The key notion behind 
this second stage is one of a «fully equipped car.» This means offering the customer a 
level of quality newly validated in the prototypes, at an attractive price that takes into 
consideration the cost of incorporating the radio mounting process into the production 
line.  
 
However, it should be noted that this model was still far from the comprehensive 
design of a car with built-in radio. As was generally the case at the time, the 
relationship between the car manufacturer and the supplier was primarily driven by the 
manufacturer’s purchasing department and the supplier’s (new) OEM sales 
department. There was little cooperation between the engineering departments of the 
two firms.  
 
For the manufacturers of car audio equipment, this new distribution channel 
represented both a major growth opportunity and a new factor to be adapted to. Car-
manufacturing customers attempted to impose particular specifications for their 
product ranges and the array of specifications exploded. The concept of a platform was 
to become the means of integrating this new diversity while preserving the economies 
of scale that are essential in the electronics field. In 1993, the studied firm grouped its 
products into families: one up-market product line, two mid-range lines and two low-
range lines. In a still later generation of products, manufacturers could concentrate on 
just two platforms—high-range and low-range—that generated all OEM and after-
sales products. 
 
 
Figure3: The three-step model of technology integration. 
Source: Kesseler 1998 
 
3. Stage Three: The co-development of the joint car/ICE system. 
 
                                                 
1 On the French market, the first car radios marketed by OEMs with new cars appeared in 1981 for Renault and 
in 1989 for Peugeot. 
A third phase, initiated by car manufacturers, got underway in the early 1990s, with 
their development of enhanced project processes (Midler 1993). This development was 
to entail multiple changes in the design process, two of which should be emphasized. 
On one hand, there was a much greater need for integration among various project 
contributors, in order to arrive at a higher-performance and more stable design 
compromise, with a resulting cost reduction and shorter timeframe. One consequence 
of this strategy was to increase the power of suppliers as major players in the design of 
automotive products. On the other hand was a need to account for the distinct nature of 
each project, so as to enhance its differentiating value. Innovation plays an essential 
role in this regard.  
 
The rapid increase in the power of these new key players in the manufacturers’ design 
process was to accelerate in the early 1990s with the creation of relationships 
described in management literature as co-development (Garel, Kesseler and Midler 
1997) or black box sourcing (Clark and Fujimoto 1991), triggering a crisis among 
suppliers involved in the internal OEM design model (Kesseler 1998).  
 
The demands for innovation, specificity, and incorporation into the car ran up against 
the «push» engineering logic prevalent among suppliers (technologies—platform—
product). The platform logic had the paradoxical effect of delaying the introduction of 
innovations in the OEM market, as neither the interface nor the supplier’s internal 
organization provided a means by which project requirements could be redirected back 
to the designers who could address them.  
 
Based on this analysis, in 1994 the studied firm undertook a thorough revision of its 
design procedures (Kesseler 1998). It created «Lines of Business» (LOBs) specific to 
each manufacturer, and having close engineering relationships with car project teams 
and provided with design and engineering capacities so that the product could be 
adapted to specific elements of each project. It reorganized the internal relationships 
between platform designers and LOBs so as to eliminate the inertia associated with 
this dual design approach and to allow those involved earlier in the process to 
incorporate the manufacturers’ expectations more effectively.  
 
Thus, three years after addressing this serious crisis, the firm was the first supplier to 
its major customer to obtain certification as a partner-supplier. Various products 
provide concrete evidence of this ability to incorporate a built-in system into the 
vehicle’s design much more thoroughly (see Figure 4) in terms of design, controls, and 
functions. 
 
4. «Co-learning» of innovative offerings in built-in services 
 
The experience of the years 1990–1995 broadly validated the significance of this 
model but also revealed its limits. The framework governing development projects was 
too limited to allow for the exploration of truly new functions or technologies. In 
addition, the principle behind co-development was to create a cooperative design 
process addressing a defined functional target: the definition of this functional 
specification fell outside the scope of this process, and went back to the pre-project 
planning or research stages.  
 
Co-learning: challenges and scope  
 
During the second half of the 1990s, various pre-project cooperative design 
experiences were initiated, building in most cases on the success of prior relationships 
arising from co-development. Thus, in 1996, the studied firm created an entity of its 
own in cooperation with Renault, the «Multimedia Data Communications Planning 
Group,» whose purpose was to pave the way for the introduction of innovations in 
automotive projects. 
 
We will define this approach as the co-learning concept (Midler 2000). The objective 
of co-development is to foster cooperation on a new product with the goal of 
enhancing the expertise of each partner regarding value-enhancing functional targets 
and the technical solutions with which they can be attained. Co-learning, on the other 
hand, is geared towards coordinating methods for exploring innovations and creating 
expertise regarding product use and technology that will prove useful in subsequent 
projects. 
 
More precisely, co-learning can be defined as cooperation in three tasks: 
- Exploration: In the area of built-in ICE systems, we have seen that the number of 
potential services has exploded, including services such as navigation, «low-cost» 
navigation, television, videogames, and the Internet. The first task of the co-learning 
process is to explore this growth as exhaustively as possible by monitoring advances in 
technology.  
- Sorting: The second task is to sort through these potential services and identify 
pertinent innovations, with a view towards extracting the greatest value from the 
innovation, as defined previously. 
- Bringing these concepts or half products (Le Masson and Weil 1999) to maturity: 
The third task is to bring the innovation to a mature form, so it can be incorporated 
into the project without unduly delaying the release of the final product or endangering 
production quality. 
 
The challenge to the supplier and manufacturer as they carry out these tasks in 
cooperation with each other is, of course, to reduce costs as well as the associated risks 
of such early exploration. The compatibility problems that arise in the later stages of a 
project, when supplier and manufacturer fail to coordinate on a «road map» in such a 
rapidly developing area, are significant, as is the risk of duplicate exploratory work. 
 
We must emphasize the twofold aspect of this co-learning process: it simultaneously 
involves defining innovative functional specifications that have the potential for 
further development, and mapping out the technological path by which they can be 
given concrete shape.  
 
New participants in the co-learning process. 
 
One consequence of defining this learning field is the need to open up the co-learning 
process to new players essential to ensuring the success of the tasks defined above. 
Such players include the service operators who will invent innovative content built 
into these systems, and distribution networks, which play a key role in Stage One but 
whose role in design all but disappears thereafter. 
 
The involvement of service operators. In October 1997, the studied firm, which was a 
subsidiary of major electronic group, was  transferred to a German group, one of the 
largest telecommunications firms and service providers in Europe. The firm 
contributed its terminal expertise to link automotive systems to the network offerings 
and services of its new owner. The German group is a European manufacturing firm 
active in dashboard instrumentation, a field in which the studied firm had no presence, 
so this step was consistent with a move towards reconfiguring ICE system architecture 
within the automotive cockpit module as well as between cars and external service 
providers. This consistent approach was not to survive the battle over portable 
telecommunications among firms in the field. On being bought out by one of its 
competitor, the German group was forced to sell its auto subsidiaries in order to 
finance the growth in GSM. They were purchased by Siemens, another major 
electronics firm, but one lacking experience in service. Note that this story is not an 
isolated example of cooperation between telecoms and automotive firms: for example, 
in 2000, PSA created a joint venture with Vivendi Universal to develop built-in data 
communication services. 
  
The return of the distribution network as a key factor in innovation. We noted in the 
preceding section a trend away from the use of existing functions (typically radios and 
cassette and CD players) towards the creation of new functions specific to the 
automobile (typically navigation). The issue of teaching customers these new 
functions seems to be a key element in making these innovations succeed, as measured 
by the speed with which they are adopted.  
 
Internal organizational dynamics associated with co-learning. 
 
As in the previous stages, the implementation of the new co-learning model entails 
both a reorganization of the relationship between cooperating companies and internal 
transformations without which this relationship cannot function. 
 
The primary trend on the part of manufacturers is to revamp their research 
departments, which have so far been only minimally integrated into the design 
operating cycle, and which are now assuming a role in the co-learning process. 
 
On the part of suppliers, the organization into LOBs, which can naturally integrate 
these new areas of cooperation with manufacturers, must be thoroughly revised insofar 
as the challenge is now to provide direction for the general dynamic of the company’s 
product portfolios and technologies, rather than to customize «semi-products» (Weil 
1999, Le Masson and Weil 2000).  
 
Finally, the control of such learning processes calls for new management principles to 
meet the specificities of such projects (Lenfle 2001, Lenfle and Midler, 2001) : such 
projects do not lead to marketable products but new knowledge which only acquires 
value in product projects 
 
Ensuring solidarity and equity to face the risk. 
 
Co-learning brings a cooperative design process into play in an area where the level of 
uncertainty is considerably greater than is the case in co-development. The traditional 
problems relating to the theory of agency and contracts analyzed in the economic 
literature, problems such as moral hazard or adverse risk selection, play an important 
role. One significant problem, currently the subject of research, is that co-learning is 
spreading from the cooperative planning of isolated projects to the joint direction of 
project portfolios. The question of dynamic balancing of risk in this portfolio is 
obviously a critical stumbling point.  
 
Finally, in order to keep the cooperation active and fruitful, the players involved in 
such co-learning situations have to evaluate and continuously control the process in 
terms of equity. In a co-development project, the cooperation can be clearly framed by 
the target of the common project and the rather explicit prior contract between the 
partners. Such framing is impossible in co-learning situation, because the results are 
multiple, indefinite, and changing, and the term of the relation unfixed. Cultivating 
feelings of equality among the players involved in the cooperation appears, therefore, 
to be a key and difficult challenge in co-learning situations. For Piron (2000, 2001) 
inter-firm equity comprises three ways in which justice or equity finds practical 
expression: distributive, procedural and interactive. Distributive justice involves the 
search for balanced proportionality between the partners—a «fair return,» in Piron’s 
words. The point is, for the firms to find a fair distribution of goods and powers based 
on the goals sought and the resources committed by each. Procedural justice refers to 
the feeling that procedures have been fair. The point is for the participants to judge a 
decision-making process relative to a reference that is well known and considered 
legitimate. The factors that influence this include a feeling of participation in decision-
making, an explanation of decisions, and clarity concerning expectations and the rules 
of the game, all of which influence whether the participants feel they have been treated 
fairly and equitably. Finally, interactive justice refers to individual interactions based 
on fairness in behavior, which makes it possible for a decision to be considered doable. 
Hence, respect and courtesy between allies proves to be important in fostering a 
positive atmosphere for interpersonal relations during the co-operation process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By emphasizing the «renewal paradox» of non-innovative, project based construction 
firms, Ekstedt, Lundin and Wirdenius (1992) pointed out the importance of a 
«permanent» organizational context in providing a sustainable environment for 
innovative projects over time. In line with this thesis, this chapter illustrates how, over 
30 years, the multiple and diversified innovative breakthroughs in the car ICE systems 
trajectory are linked with major changes in the internal organization of the studied firm 
in relation to its operating environment. 
 
In the transformation process of the innovative design system of the firm, the «co-
learning,» inter-firm cooperation model appears to be the final, promising but also 
problematic step in meeting the challenge of the intensive innovation context. The co-
learning situation can be described in the following matrix. It describes a situation 
where the partners of the innovative cooperation are confronted by both important 
economic stakes, in terms of market shares and investment, and great uncertainties 
with regard to the possible results. Such a situation differs from that of a co-research 
partnership, where the stakes are less important, and from a co-development alliance, 
where the focus on the planned target is a key resource for inter-firm coordination. 
 
           Uncertainties and risks 
 
Economic stakes (market & costs) 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
  
Research partnerships 
 
High 
 
 
Co-development 
 
 
Co-learning  
Table 3: Different cooperation situations in innovative design processes 
Source: Midler 2000 
 
We pointed out in our last section some of the characteristics of and conditions for 
efficient co-learning management; these include multi-projects, multi-horizons 
management, immaterial results, loosely framed relations and commitments, and 
shared feeling of equity among the participants. Such characteristics clearly cannot be 
described by traditional project management models. The opportunities for research 
into innovative project management in the new millennium are still great. 
 
* 
*     * 
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Appendix 1: Historical Overview of Car radio Product 
Appendix2: Product Evolution from Auto Radio to Information-Communication-
Entertainment Systems 
 
Figure1: First car radio 1928 (Motorola) 
Source: Kesseler, p. 101. 
          
 Fig 2: Circa car radio, 1955,                               Fig 3: All transistor car radio, 1967, Philips 
Source: Kesseler 1998, p. 103                                           Source: Kesseler 1998, p. 104. 
-  
 
Fig 4 : PCS information-communication-entertainment system, 1995. 
Source: Kesseler 1998, p. 108 
 
 
Figure 5: Future services provided in ICE systems.
Appendix 3: Transition from Hardware to Software 
 
 
 
